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PROTECTING THE CELLULAR CITIZEN-CRITIC:
THE STATE OF POLITICAL SPEECH FROM
SULLIVAN TO POPA
Clay Calvert*
The 1999federal appellate court decision ofUnited States v. Popa suggests the
startling emergence of a nascent First Amendment right to engage in anonymous
and racist telephonic harassment of government officials. Professor Calvert
suggests that this decision sadly reflects the state of political discourse in the
United States today, namely a dialecticalfree-for-all directly contrary to the vision
of philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn, a vision advanced by the United
States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan but rejected by the shout-
and-attack cultures of cable news channel political talk shows and call-in radio
programs. The Popa decision also serves to jeopardize the constitutionality of a
number of state laws substantially mirroring the federal anti-harassment statute it
held unconstitutional as applied. Professor Calvert argues that the Popa decision's
initial impression of being a victory for freedom of expression belies its real
significance as a signal of a stunning defeat for, and the deterioration of, rational,
deliberative discourse.
* * *
In its seminal defamation decision of New York Times v. Sullivan,' decided
during the heart of the Civil Rights Movement in 1964, the United States Supreme
Court simultaneously celebrated and privileged political speech under the First
Amendment.2 The Court adopted the actual malice standard3 to serve as a
"privilege for the citizen-critic of government," proclaiming that "[i]t is as much his
duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer."4 In embracing protection
for individuals and the press to criticize public officials about their official conduct,
* Assistant Professor of Communications & Law, and Co-Director of the Pennsylvania
Center for the First Amendment, at The Pennsylvania State University.
376 U.S. 254 (1964). For an excellent examination of the Sullivan decision, see
ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
2 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that
"Congress shall make no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated, through
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, to apply to state and local government
entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
1 See 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED
PROBLEMS § 1.3 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the meaning of "actual malice" and how the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted and applied that concept).
4 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282.
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the Court recognized what it called "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open," and acknowledged that this debate "may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.",
Now fast-forward some thirty-plus years to a new era of politics and the federal
appellate court case of United States v. Popa.6 Ion Comel Popa, playing the role of
a modem-day citizen-critic of government, engaged in his own form of uninhibited,
robust and wide-open expression in 1997. In a one-month period that year, Popa
made seven anonymous phone calls to the office of Eric Holder, the United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia. The substance of those calls is sufficiently
summed up by this passage from one that was recorded: "Eric Holder is a negro.
Is a negro. Which is a criminal. He make a violent crime against me, violating the
rights in court of the white people. [Inaudible] negro. He's negro. Eric Holder.
Criminal."8
For this fractured, racist message and other similar invectives, Popa was
prosecuted under a well-established and generally-applicable federal law that
criminalizes making anonymous phone calls "with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten,
or harass any person at the called number or who receives the communications." 9
After less than one hour of deliberations, a jury convicted Popa and he was
sentenced to nine months of time already served.' 0
Popa, as the tenor of his message suggests, would not go down quietly. He
claimed the telephone harassment statute violated his First Amendment right of free
speech." In particular, the political refugee from Romania contended he was not,
in fact, harassing Holder, but merely was engaging in political speech-the same
type of expression prized by the United States Supreme Court in Sullivan back in
1964.
In late 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit accepted Popa's political speech argument. The D.C. Circuit vacated his
conviction, concluding that the statute "could have been drawn more narrowly,
without any loss of utility to the Government, by excluding from its scope those
Id. at 270.
6 187 F.3d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
7 See id. at 673.Id. at 674.
9 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2060). A separate and distinct part of this statute dealing
with sexually-explicit telephone messages (dial-a-por) was held unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds in 1989. See Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(finding the blanket prohibition in 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) on indecent interstate commercial
telephone messages unconstitutional).Popa, 187 F.3d at 674.
' See id at 673-74.
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who intend to engage in public or political discourse."'2 The appellate court
remarked that people who make anonymous and abusive phone calls with the intent
to communicate a political message, should be given "a pass."' 3 Parsed differently
and more bluntly, the decision suggests the emergence of a nascent First
Amendment right to engage in anonymous, telephonic harassment of government
officials.
The decision to protect Popa's bigoted bile raises a bevy of questions of
constitutional importance as we enter a new millennium. Are racist, anonymous
telephone messages the type of political speech the Sullivan Court envisioned
should be protected under the First Amendment? Is it even political speech in the
first place? Furthermore, can it be said to constitute "debate" under the Sullivan
framework given that there was no dialogue or discourse? 4 Can any annoying and
abusive telephone call now be protected by tossing in a political message or a
statement about a public official and then claiming the intent was not to abuse or
annoy but to transmit the political statement? Is protecting Popa's vituperations
simply a small price to be paid for safeguarding more deliberative discourse and
discussion in democracy? The seemingly insignificant case of a political refugee
making anonymous phone calls in halting, broken English raises these and other
important questions.
In particular, Part I of this Article examines the importance of political speech
in a self-governing democracy by describing the writings of philosopher-educator
Alexander Meiklejohn and then showing how the United States Supreme Court
embraced Meiklejohn's views about free speech in New York Times v. Sullivan."
Part I also discusses the importance of anonymous expression, namely speech in
which the author/speaker's identity remains unknown or cloaked, concerning
politics that has been recognized by the Supreme Court.'6 Part II then analyzes the
reasoning and decision of the appellate court in United States v. Popa.7 Next, Part
III explores the possible implications of Popa for the dozens of state statutes that
substantively mirror the federal law challenged in that case, as well as Popa's
potential ramifications for other areas in which citizens seek to criticize public
officials both anonymously and abusively."
Part IV argues that the Popa decision sadly reflects the state of political
discourse in the United States today: a dialectical free-for-all directly contrary to
Meiklejohn's now-vintage vision, but one that is fully embraced in the shout-and-
attack culture of television political talk shows on the cable news channels and in
12 ldat 677.
13 Id.
'4 The calls were answered and recorded by clerical staff, not by Eric Holder. Id.
's Infra notes 20-72 and accompanying text.
16 Infra notes 73-201 and accompanying text.
17 Infra notes 103-136 and accompanying text.
s Infra notes 137-159 and accompanying text.
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the world of call-in radio. 9 This Part contends that the media have reduced
political discourse to such a low level that it becomes almost natural,. if not
inevitable, to hold that Ion Cornel Popa's racial epithets constitute political speech.
Finally, the Article concludes that Popa's initialappearance of being a victory
for freedom of expression belies its real significance for highlighting the depths to
which political speech now has plunged. The triumph of Ion Cornel Popa
ultimately signals a stunning defeat for, and the deterioration of, rational,
deliberative discourse.
I. POLITICAL SPEECH, DEMOCRACY, AND DISCOURSE
This Part explains the legal and public policy context necessary to fully
understand the appellate court's decision to protect Ion Cornel Popa's telephonic
expression. Section A initially explores Alexander Meiklejohn's writings
concerning the importance of political speech in a democracy. Section B then
examines the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,
demonstrating the nexus between Meiklejohn's work and the Court's opinion
privileging political expression. Next, Section C describes the significance of
anonymous political speech in the United States and the high value placed on it by
the Court. Finally, Section D provides further context for examination of the Popa
decision by looking at recent state cases involving harassing telephone messages.
A. Alexander Meiklejohn and Democratic Self-Governance
As Professor Rodney Smolla writes, free speech "is an indispensable tool of
self-governance in a democratic society."'2 Perhaps no person is better associated
with this position and belief than the late philosopher-educator Alexander
Meiklejohn.2" Meiklejohn believed that "[t]he principle of the freedom of speech
springs from the necessities of the program of self-government."22 In a self-
governing democracy, one in which the "[rjulers and ruled are the same
"' Infra notes 160-206 and accompanying text.
20 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 12 (1992).
2 Meiklejohn was far more than a free speech theorist. See generally ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN: TEACHER OF FREEDOM (Cynthia Stokes Brown ed., 1981) (combining a
collection of Meiklejohn's educational, philosophical, and legal writings with biographical
information). Meiklejohn "wanted higher education to develop social intelligence in
students" which he defined as "the ability to control one's social environment." MICHAEL
R. HARRIS, FIVE COUNTERREVOLUTIONISTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 46 (1970). Meiklejohn
ultimately "believed that the college, standing apart from its social environment, should
develop in its students the intelligence to become responsible citizens of a democratic
society." Id. at 163.
22 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 27 (1948).
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individuals," wise decisions about public policy require that "all facts and %interests
relevant to the [decision] shall be fully and fairly presented." 4 As Meiklejohn
wrote, "[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that,
in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express."'
Although Meiklejohn privileged political speech, namely speech "upon matters
of the public interest, '' 26 he felt that some political expression may be abridged to
facilitate an orderly, productive debate. Meiklejohn remarked that theFirst
Amendment is "not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness "" and that public
discussion must not become "a dialectical free-for-all."' The style and manner of
presentation of political speech is important. As he wrote, "facts and interests must
be given in such a way that all the alternative lines of action can be measured wisely
in relation to-one another." 9 Some speech about politics may, then, be regulated.
Thus it is not essential for Meiklejohn that everyone shall speak, "but that
everything worth saying shall be said."3
Meiklejohn illustrates this point by using "the traditional American town
meeting" as "a model by which free political procedures-may be measured."' The
meeting requires that "certain rules of order will be observed." 2 What speech is
considered "out of order?" Speech that is redundant,?3 that "wanders from the point
at issue," '34 that is interruptive,35 or that mutilates the thinking process of the
'3 /d at 12.
24 Id. at 26.
2s Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245,
255.
26 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 24.
27 Id. at 26.
23 ld at 25.
29 Id. at 26.
30 Id (emphasis added).
3, Id at 24. Today town meetings are anachronisms "surviving only in a few eccentric
backwaters of Ye Olde New England." Andrew Ferguson, Ye Olde Town Gimmick, TIME,
Mar. 2, 1998, at 88.
32 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 24.
13 Meiklejohn wrote:
If, for example, at a town meeting, twenty like-minded citizens have become a
"party," and if one of them has read to the meeting an argument which they have
all approved, it would be ludicrously out of order for each of the others to insist
on reading it again. No competent moderator would tolerate that wasting of the
time available for free discussion.
Id at26.
34 Id. at 24-25. Likewise, speech that is irrelevant to a public issue is not protected, as
Meiklejohn observes that "all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and
fairly presented to the meeting." Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
" See id at 24 ("If one man 'has the floor,' no one else may interrupt him except as
provided by the rules.").
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community.36 The debate, in other words, must be reflective and deliberative,
following certain procedures that facilitate these ends.3 It must be structured. 8
The quality of that public discussion and debate, in turn, is measured by its capacity
to facilitate wise public decision-making. 39
Meiklejohn also suggested that individuals and entities must exercise self-
control in the use of the freedom of speech: "Political freedom does not mean
freedom from control[,] [i]t means self-control."4 In turn, "we must exercise
control over our separate members." ' We must cooperate with each other and have
"responsible" discussion.42
Speech, however, may not be prohibited because it is thought to be false,
dangerous, unwise, unfair, "un-American," or disagreeable.4 3 As Meiklejohn wrote,
citizens "may not be barred [from speaking] because their views are thought to be
false or dangerous. No plan of action shall be outlawed because someone in control
thinks it unwise, unfair, un-American. ' '44
Likewise, legislative control should not cover verbal attacks made to show the
unfitness of a candidate for governmental office.45 Instead, as Meiklejohn writes,
"all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented to
the meeting.""" All information, in other words, that can make voters "as wise as
possible"47 must be permitted. Congress thus may create legislation designed to
"enlarge and enrich" freedom of Speech on public issues and to facilitate "the
unhindered flow of accurate information," but not to take away from the
presentation of diverse perspectives." Congress, as.Meiklejohn put it, is "not
forbidden to engage in that positive enterprise of cultivating the general intelligence
36 See id. at 27 ("It is the mutilation of the thinking process of the community against
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.").
31 See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1762
(1995) (stating that Meiklejohn's views on our constitutional system emphasize deliberative
democracy in which there is "reflective and deliberative debate about possible courses of
action").
18 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS IN AMERICA 247 (1991).
'9 See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT 271 (1995).
40 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 13.
41 Id. at 16.
41 See id. at 25.
41 See id. at 27.
44 Id. (emphasis added).
41 See Meiklejohn, supra note 25, at 259.
46 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 26.
47 id.
41 Id. at 19 ("Congress is not debarred from all action upon freedom of speech.
Legislation which abridges that freedom is forbidden, but not legislation to enlarge and
enrich it.").
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upon which the success of self-government so obviously depends." '49
In summary, Meiklejohn articulated a theory of privileged political speech by
reasoning that such expression could be restricted only in very narrow
circumstances. An obvious problem with Meiklejohn's theory, however, is the
difficulty of defining political speech. As Professor Smolla writes, "in modem life
it is virtually impossible to identify any topic that might not bear some relation to
self-governance."" ° Meiklejohn himself focused on speech "upon matters of the
public interest,"51 and speech that affects the "general welfare."52 As will be
discussed later in Parts II and IV, it is far from obvious or self-evident that the
speech of Ion Cornel Popa is political expression or, even if it is political
expression, whether it is the kind that promotes Meiklejohnian "wise debate and
discussion." Meiklejohn, it will be recalled, believed that everything "worth saying
shall be said." 3 It can be debated whether Popa's speech truly was "worth saying,"
at least to the extent of meriting exemption from the reach of a statute punishing
otherwise annoying and abusive anonymous phone calls. What is clear, however,
is that Popa argued that he was engaging in political discourse, allegedly "to
complain about having been assaulted by police officers and about the prosecutor's
conduct of a case against him."'
B. New York Times v. Sullivan and the Protection of Political Speech
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that, according to
First Amendment scholar Lucas A. Powe, Jr., embraced "the insights of the
philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn on the necessities of political speech."55 Prior
to that year, the Court had not yet applied the First Amendment protections of
speech and press to limit the reach of state libel laws in compensating plaintiffs for
reputational harm.56 False, defamatory speech simply fell beyond the purview of
First Amendment protection. As Anthony Lewis writes, "[i]ibelous utterances had
always been regarded as outside the First Amendment, an exception to the 'freedom
of speech' it guarantees."57
That changed with the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v.
49 Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
50 SMOLLA, supra note 20, at 15.
s' MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 24.
52 Id. at 87.
3 Supra note 30 and accompanying text.
14 United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
" POWE, supra note 38, at 87.
56 See KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 272 (2d ed.
1996) (stating that "[blefore 1964 and the New York Times decision, libel suits were a matter
of state law").
" LEWIS, supra note 1, at 42.
2001]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Sullivan.5" The decision "constitutionalized" libel law.59 The Sullivan Court held
for the first time that libel law "must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment."': It adopted a rule, known as the actual malice fault standard, to give
the press what it needed to play a central role in facilitating public debate
concerning government officials and policies. The Court-wrote:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.6 '
The Court held the actual malice standard was necessary to provide "the citizen-
critic of government"62 with the "breathing space"'3 required to engage in the kind
of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"' 4 debate on public issues that is vital in a
self-governing democracy. The Court would later say in another defamation case
that the actual malice standard is "an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement
to media self-censorship [by] the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and
slander."65
The Supreme Court observed in Sullivan that "erroneous statement is inevitable
in free debate."' If error is inevitable and citizens can be punished for any error,
then self-censorship is extremely likely. Application of strict liability principles
"thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate."'" The Court
s 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See HAROLD W. FUSON, JR., TELLING IT ALL: A LEGAL GUIDE
TO THE EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH 18 (1995) (observing that "[iln Sullivan, the Supreme
Court announced for the first time that the common law of libel, which predated the
enactment of the Constitution by several centuries and had continued to evolve unmolested
by federal courts well into the 1960s,'could be trumped by the First Amendment"); RODNEY
A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS: LIBEL, THE MEDIA, & POWER 27 (1986) (stating that "Times
v. Sullivan revolutionized the American law of libel because in one sudden burst of federal
judicial power, state libel laws were made subject to the strictures of the First Amendment").
'9 See POWE, supra note 38, at 89 (observing that the Sullivan Court "entered a brand-
new era of law and dramatically constitutionalized it"); see also Marc A. Franklin & Daniel
J. Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 825, 825-26 (1984) (stating that "[b]y constitutionalizing the common law of
defamation, the United States Supreme Court dramatically reshaped the elements of the
plaintiff's prima facie case").
60 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
61 Id. at 279-80.
62 Id. at 282.
61 Id. at 272.
64 Id. at 270.
6 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
66 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
67 Id at 279.
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explained that under the rule of strict liability:
Would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their
criticism; even though it is believed to be.true and even though it is in
fact true, because ofdoubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of
the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which
"steer far wide[] of the unlawful zone."
Adoption of the actualmalice standard in Sullivan was thus premised on the
policy of preventing the self-censorship of speech about matters affecting
democratic self-governance. Justice William Brennan's decision, in turn, is often
linked to the work Alexander Meiklejohn described in Section A.69 This link was
cemented when Brennan paid homage to Meiklejohn in a Brown University
* lecture.7" Today, as University of Chicago constitutional law scholar Cass Sunstein
observes, it is a "relatively uncontroversial working hypothesis, that the decision
rested on Professor Meiklejohn's conception of the First Amendment."'"
Sullivan, in brief, is "one of the defining cases of modern free speech law."'
In particular, it defines the important role of the citizen-critic of government affairs
and public officials, a role previously recognized and valued by Meiklejohn. It is
far from clear whether Ion Cornel Popa plays this important role with his telephone
calls to the office of Eric Holder. That issue, and whether Popa's speech actually
contributes to the public debate privileged in Sullivan, is analyzed later in Part IV
of this Article. Indeed, it is argued in that Part that the Popa decision may have
ripped political speech from its Sullivan moorings and unnecessarily extended its
protection beyond what Justice Brennan envisioned.
6I Id. (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
69 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 49 (1986) (observing what he calls an axiomatic
"Meiklejohn-Sullivan alliance"). The source of this link is often attributed to a 1964 law
journal article about Sullivan that made specific reference to Meiklejohn: Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964
SUP. CT. REV. 191, 209 (stating that the Sullivan opinion "almost literally incorporated
Alexander Meiklejohn's thesis that in a democracy the citizen as ruler is our most important
public official"). Bollinger argues that Kalven's article confirmed the association between
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sullivan and the philosophy of Meiklejohn. See
BOLLINGER, supra, at 49.
" See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of
the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. I (1965).
" Cass R. Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARYL. REv. 891,898 (1984).
7' CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 205 (1993).
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C. The Right to SpeakAnonymously
Ion Comel Popa's telephonic messagestargeting Eric Holder were (or, at least,
so he thought) anonymous; he did not knowingly reveal his identity or state his
name." The United States Supreme Court has, in fact, recognized the benefit of
protecting anonymous political expression in several decisions.74 Some argument
can thus be made that Popa's anonymous speech deserves First Amendment
protection.
Most recently, for instance, the Court's 1999 decision of Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation" held unconstitutional a Colorado law that required
citizens circulating ballot initiative petitions to wear identification badges revealing
their names. 6 The Court emphasized that the "badge requirement discourages
participation in the petition circulation process by forcing name identification
without sufficient cause." In other words, if one's name was publicly known in
association with an unpopular position, one might be intimidated from engaging in
speech.
Just four years prior to Buckley, the Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission 8 held unconstitutional an Ohio law that prohibited the distribution of
anonymous campaign literature.79 Justice John Paul Stevens, citing the work of
philosopher John Stuart Mill, wrote that "[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny
of the majority""° and added that although "the right to remain anonymous may be
abused when it shields fraudulent conduct," political speech "by its nature will
sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in general, our society accords
greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse."'
'
Justice Clarence Thomas, in a lengthy concurring opinion embodying the
original intent philosophy of constitutional interpretation, 2 concluded that "[t]here
is little doubt that the Framers engaged in anonymous political writing." 3 He added
that "it seems the Framers understood the First Amendment to protect an author's
73 United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
71 See Michael H. Spencer, Anonymous Internet Communication and the First
Amendment: A Crack in the Dam of National Sovereignty, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1998) at
http://vjolt. student.virginia.edu/graphics/v013/homeartI .html ("In the realm of anonymous
communication, the Court has taken the view that the right to speak anonymously is
protected under the First Amendment guarantee.").
" 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
76 See id, at 200.
7 Id. (emphasis added).
78 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
79 See id at 357.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See id, at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that "[w]e should seek the original
understanding when we interpret the Speech and Press Clauses").
83 Id. at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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right to express his thoughts on political candidates or issues in an anonymous
fashion." '84
In a much earlier case holding unconstitutional a Los Angeles ordinance that
forbade the distribution of anonymous handbills, the Court had observed that
"[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an
important role in the progress of mankind."8 The Court emphasized that a "fear of
reprisal" that deters "discussions of public matters of importance" is a negative side
effect or consequence of statutes that require name disclosure.86
In summary, the compelled disclosure of a speaker's identity has been held
unconstitutional in situations where the Court perceived a specific risk of retaliation
if the identity was known, 7 and in circumstances in which disclosure would
unnecessarily chill expression. To the extent that Ion Come] Popa actually was
engaging in political expression critical of Eric Holder, a somewhat suspect
assumption addressed later in Parts 1I and IV, he reasonably might have feared
retaliation from Holder had he revealed his identity to the clerical staff who took his
messages. Indeed, Popa ultimately did face retaliation: he was prosecuted for
making phone calls with the intent to annoy, abuse, and harass. The First
Amendment right to engage in anonymous communication is thus clearly implicated
in this case. Whether it is enough to protect Popa, however, is a different issue
discussed later.
D. Harassing Phone Call Statutes and the First Amendment
The vast majority of states, as this Article discusses later in Part III, have
statutes that, like the federal law at issue in Popa, punish annoying and harassing
phone calls. Part III explores the possible ramifications of the Popa decision on
those statutes. At this point, however, it is worth noting that some of these state
laws have been challenged very recently on similar First Amendment grounds.8
Consider, for instance, the 1999 decision in State v. Bell.9 Frank Bell appealed
Id. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring).
85 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1959).
86 Id. at 65.
87 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV.
311, 327 (1998) (citations omitted).
88 In addition to the Bell case described in the text of this section, see Townsendv. Texas,
No. 14-96-01571-CR, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 9561 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 1999)
(upholding the constitutionality of Texas' statute against telephonic harassment and rejecting
challenges based on alleged vagueness and overbreadth) and City ofBellevue v. Lorang, 992
P.2d 496, 500 (Wash. 2000) (holding unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds a city's
telephone harassment ordinance forbidding "profane" speech and speech "without purpose
of legitimate communication," but noting that the First Amendment "does not bar the state
from outlawing speech based on harassment").
89 739 A.2d 714 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999), appeal denied, 743 A.2d 619 (Conn. 1999).
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his conviction for harassment in the second degree on the ground that "he was
exercising his federal first amendment right to speak on matters of public concern,
since his calls related to the safety and welfare of children."9 Specifically, Bell
allegedly made about forty-five telephone calls'to Various employees of the
Quinnebaug Valley Youth and Family Services, a public agency operating a family
preservation program in which Bell's former girlfriend had enrolled their children.9
The calls, thirty-six of which were voice mail recordings, criticized employees of
this government agency and involved "language that made them feel threatened with
bodily harm to themselves and their families."9
Under Connecticut law, a person is guilty of harassment in the second degree
when "with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he makes a
telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause
annoyance and alarm."'9 Bell was convicted under this law." As mentioned above,
however, he appealed this conviction on the grounds that he was engaging in speech
about matters of public concern relating to the welfare and safety of children.9"
The state appellate court unanimously rejected this argument. In particular, the
court observed:
Although the defendant claims that the statute prevents him from
speaking out on matters of public concern, it merely prohibits purposeful
harassment by the use of the telephone and does not involve first
amendment concerns. The statute proscribes conduct, not the content of
the telephone calls. The risk that the statute will have a chilling effect
on the exercise of free speech therefore is remote compared with the
prevalent misuse of telephones to harass others and to invade their
privacy."
The appellate court also rejected Bell's argument that the harassment statute
was unconstitutionally vague, as applied to his conduct, on the point that it did not
provide him with notice of what conduct was unlawful."' The court thus affirmed
the conviction for harassment.98
What is most striking about this decision is the court's conclusion that the
statute focuses on conduct, not speech. This allows the court to deftly sidestep First
90 Id. at 716.
91 See id.
92 Id
91 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183 (1999).
94 See Bell, 739 A.2d at 715.
s See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
Bell, 739 A.2d at 718 (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 718-19.
91 Id. at 719-20.
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Amendment concerns.99 Clearly the messages involved speech, but the court
reasoned that it was the conduct of making a telephone call with requisite intent that
was being punished and it cited an earlier state court decision for the proposition
that although words "may be the instrument of annoyance" they are not insulated
from liability for wrongful criminal conduct."°
In stark contrast to this Connecticut decision, the federal appellate court in Popa
squarely rejected the government's argument that the federal law targeted conduct
and not speech.' Concurring in Popa, Judge Randolph wrote:
Whether the caller is exercising his "freedom of speech" depends on
what he says and why. A blackmail attempt, a bomb threat, a fraudulent
promise, a kidnapper's demands - all are communications, but none are
protected by the First Amendment. Partly this is because of history;
partly it is because of the consequences of such communications. To
characterize anonymous telephone calls intended to annoy or harass as
"conduct" rather than speech is to confuse the analysis.102
The speech-conduct dichotomy is thus an important issue to consider when
determining the constitutionality of statutes concerning telephonic harassment. If
a statute is construed merely to regulate conduct, then no First Amendment issues
are involved. Fortunately for Ion Cornel Popa, however, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the federal law, unlike
the Connecticut appellate court's determination involving a state statute in Bell,
directly regulated expression. The Popa decision and its First Amendment issues
are thus discussed below in Part 11.
II. HARASSMENT, POLITICS AND FREE EXPRESSION:
THE STRANGE SAGA OF ION CORNEL POPA
Ion Cornel Popa came to the United States in 1986, a refugee from the
repressive and tyrannical regime that was Nicolae Ceausescu's Romania.103
9 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citation omitted) ("In deciding
whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First
Amendment into play, we have asked whether '[a]n intent, to convey a particularized
message was present and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."').
100 Bell, 739 A.2d at 717 (citing State v. Anonymous, 389 A.2d 1270, 1274 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1978), cert. denied State v. Gormley, 382 A.2d 1332 (Conn. 1978)).
lo' See United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
02 Id. at 679 (Randolph, J., concurring).
"o See id. at 673. See generally MARY ELLEN FISCHER, NICOLAE CEAUSESCU: A STUDY
IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1989) (describing the life and leadership of Ceausescu); DANIEL
N. NELSON, ROMANIAN POLrTCS IN THE CEAUSESCU ERA (1988) (describing Romania under
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Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, would be executed just three years later on
Christmas Day.' °4 The transition for Popa to life in his newfound democratic home,
however, apparently was anything but smooth.
In 1992, for instance, Popa claims to have called the police to complain that he
had been threatened by an African-American.0 5 According to Popa, two African-
American officers arrived on the scene and then "came after me-and beat me up."' 6
Sometime after that, Popa ran into more trouble with the law; he allegedly made
threats to a bank employee and was prosecuted for his fulminations. 7 In that case,
he contended that the government "failed to give me in advance what government
witnesses are against me."'0 8
By 1997, the year Popa made his telephone calls to Eric Holder's office, he was
living with an acquaintance who allegedly made him read Ku Klux Klan literature
and propaganda."° The friend, Popa contends, plied him with liquor and told him
to call Holder's office, threatening to "turn him out in the street if he refused to
make the calls."'"10
So, rather than be rendered homeless, and apparently carrying a metaphorical
axe to grind with law enforcement and the government, Popa called the office of the
United States Attorney seven times during a one-month period.", The calls were
answered by clerical staff."' Two of those calls actually were recorded and the
resulting tapes reveal that Popa called Holder "a criminal, a negro," as well as a
"whore, born by anegro whore.""' Popa also stated that Holder "violated... our
rights"' 4 and "make [sic] a violent crime against me, violating the rights in court
of the white people.""' 5
What was the point of this racist invective? Was it caused by the reading of
Klan literature? Was it simply the rantings of an angry man far from home? Popa
would later claim, on appeal from his conviction for violating the federal law
against making anonymous phone calls with the intent to annoy, abuse and harass, 116
that he was calling simply to complain about both his alleged mistreatment by the
police officers in 1992 and the later alleged failure by the government to supply him
the regime of Ceausescu).
0 Matei Calinescu & Vladimir Tismaneanu, The 1989 Revolution and Romania's
Future, in ROMANIA AFTER TYRANNY 11, 14 (Daniel N. Nelson ed., 1992).
"'o See Popa, 187 F.3d at 675.
106 Id
107 See id
108 Id.
109 See id, at 674.
110 Id. I
I See id. at 677.
112 See id.
"I Id. at 673.
114 Id.
"1 Id. at 674.
116 See 47 U.S.C. § 223(1)(a)(C) (1994).
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with the names of witnesses against him in the bank employee threats case." ' Popaargued that the generally applicable law was drafted too broadly so as to punish his
expression, which he claimed was political in nature:
The statute sweeps within its prohibitions telephone calls to public
officials where the caller may not want to identify himself other than as
a constituent and the caller has an intent to verbally "abuse" a public
official for voting a particular way on a public bill, "annoy" him into
changing a course of public action, or "harass" him until he addresses
problems previously left unaddressed."'
The statute, Popa argued, should have been more narrowly tailored and
carefully crafted to provide a specific exemption for speech, such as his, that was
directed at a public official." 9 Under established principles of First Amendment
jurisprudence, both content-based and content-neutral laws must be narrowly
tailored to serve their objectives if they are to survive judicial scrutiny. ,2 0
The government countered that the statute already was narrowly tailored and
that Popa's calls possessed no political content.' Judge Ginsburg, writing the
opinion for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
rejected the government's arguments.' The appellate court, in fact, found that
"complaints about the actions of a government official were a significant component
of his [Popa's] calls."' 3 It agreed with Popa that "the statute could have been
drawn more narrowly, without any loss of utility to the Government, by excluding
from its scope those who intend to engage in public or political discourse."' 24
Ginsburg wrote that the statute, as presently drafted; gives "no protection
whatsoever" to
the political speech of one who intends both to communicate his political
message and to annoy his auditor--an auditor who might be his elected
representative or, as here, an Officer of the United States appointed by
117 See Popa, 187 F.3d at 675.
18 Id. at 676-77.
119 See id. at 676.
20 See generally Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent
Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 69 (1997)
(describing the applicable judicial standards of review for content-neutral, content-based,
and viewpoint-based statutes).
121 Popa, 187 F.3d at 677.
122 See id. at 677-78.
123 Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
124 Id.
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the President with the advice and consent of the Senate-from whom the
speaker seeks redress.'25
In vacating Popa's conviction, the appellate court appeared to create a new First
Amendment right: a right to annoy, harass, and abuse a government official with
repeated anonymous phone calls, provided that a significant component of those
calls constitutes a complaint against the official and the caller successfully contends
the intent is to engage in public or political discourse. This inchoate right appears
to affect numerous state laws that involve telephonic harassment, a problem that
Part III later addresses. At this point, however, it is important to note some other
potential problems and pitfalls with this test, at least as it was applied to the case of
Ion Comel Popa.
First, it is highly questionable whether the appellate court reached the correct
conclusion in finding that "a significant component" of Popa's calls involved
political expression. 26 Although' Popa testified that he called Holder's office to
complain about having been assaulted by police officers and about the prosecutor's
conduct in the threats case pending against him,'27 none of the calls cited by the
appellate court either specifically refers to, or directly describes, these incidents.
2s
Clearly the statements that Holder is "'a criminal, a negro,' a 'criminal with cold
blood,' and a 'whore, born by a negro whore, [who] became chief prosecutor of
Washington, D.C."' do not refer, directly or otherwise, to these two incidents.
2 9
Instead, these statements are either rhetoric, or racist, or some combination of the
two. Likewise, the statements that "Eric Holder is a negro. Is a negro. Which is
criminal." and "He's negro. Eric Holder. Criminal.' 30 are far more racial
hyperbole than political dialogue. Indeed, the only two statements recorded that
even remotely refer to the political incidents or are tangentially political in nature
are: Holder "violated... our rights"'' and "He make a violent crime against me,
violating the rights in court of white people."'
3 2
If this is all that it takes to make a message political---calling up a government
official and stating generically that he or she committed a crime or violated one's
rights-then it is relatively easy to escape prosecution under the federal law. One
simply needs to sprinkle in a few such statements amidst a stream of otherwise
125 Id. at 678.
126 Id. at 677.
127 See id
128 See id at 673-74 (setting forth Popa's statements to Holder's office).
129 Id. at 673.
"0 Id. at 674.
' Id. at 673.
132 Id. at 674.
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racially-charged rhetoric and babble, and then claim the intent was noble: "to
engage in political discourse and dialogue."
This, in turn, relates to a second problem with the test as applied in Popa. The
appellate court concludedthat "the' statute could have been drawn more narrowly,
without any loss- of utility to the Government; by excluding from its scope those
who intend to engage in public or political discourse."'34 The problem is that Ion
Cornel Popa was not engaged in discourse or discussion with anybody. He simply
was leaving messages with clerical personnel. There never was any conversation
with Eric Holder. It was only one-way, unidirectional communication without the
type of feedback or interaction that is concomitant with discourse and debate. The
messages do not even invite discourse or dialogue but are, instead, more in the form
of ranting monologues than dialogues. This was solitary expression, not discourse.
It takes two people to have discourse, and here there was only one person leaving
a message. Therefore, there arguably was no intent to engage Holder in discourse.
What is more, there was nothingpublic about the communications of Ion Cornel
Popa. For instance, this was not speech offered up for review in a public letter to
the editor of a newspaper, or posted anonymously in a chat room on the Internet.'3
It was not, in brief, a public appeal. It was, instead, apersonal telephone call that
was never intended for public consumption, discourse or debate.
Consider a hypothetical that illustrates some ofthese criticisms. An anonymous
caller rings up the office of Justice Clarence Thomas and leaves messages with a
clerk or staff member. The individual engages in this behavior seven to ten times
each month, every month. In the calls, the individual repeatedly berates Thomas as
a "nigger" and a "criminal." However, in each message, the caller manages to slip
in a comment such as, "And by the way, your concurrence in Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation36 was outrageous, wrong, and just plain stupid."
This comment certainly is more specific and direct than any of the ostensibly
political messages left by Popa. A comment such as this last one about a judicial
decision, tossed in by a person claiming to have the intent to engage in speech about
a case that affects the ballot-initiative process, certainly has the trappings of
political speech that, under Popa, would be protected even if made repeatedly.
Popa, in brief, gives a free pass to harass, telephonically, public officials if some
variation of a political message is added to the verbal barrage.
The Popa decision also fails to make clear whether its holding applies only
when the caller directly contacts the office of a public official. What happens when
a harassing caller is contacting a non-government official, such as an innocent third
133 See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
s For an article discussing anonymous expression on the Internet, see Anne Wells
Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, andAccountability: Challenges to the First Amendment
in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639 (1995).
136 525 U.S. 182, 206-15 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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party, but makes the call to complain about a government official? Is this speech
protected within the scope of the political speech exception that shielded Ion Cornel
Popa? This question was not squarely addressed in Popa and probably will not be
resolved until a case on point arises.
The next Part of this Article discusses another problem with the Popa decision.
In particular, it describes its effect on a number of state statutes that mirror the
federal law challenged by Ion Cornel Popa. In addition, Part III briefly describes
other areas of the law that could be influenced by the holding in Popa.
III. POPA AND THE RAMIFICATIONS FOR STATE STATUTES
Ion Cornel Popa was prosecuted under a federal law prohibiting harassing
interstate phone calls and harassing calls made in the District of Columbia. 3 " In
particular, the federal law provides for fines and imprisonment of up to two years
for anyone who "makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device,
whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing his
identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called
number or who receives the communications."'3 The decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to hold this law
unconstitutional, as applied to the speech of Ion Cornel Popa,"' 9 could affect far
more than the reach of one federal law if the appellate court's reasoning and logic
are accepted by other federal courts and by state tribunals.
In particular, nearly all states today have criminal statutes that punish
harassment by communications, including, in many states, harassment by telephonic
communications. 4  Some of these statutes employ language that closely
'3 See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2000).
138 Id.
"3 See United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
140 See ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-8 (1994 & Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120 (Michie
1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2921 (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-208 (Michie 1997);
CAL. PENALCODE § 653m (1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111 (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-183 (West 1958 & Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1311 (1999); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-39.1 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106 (1993 & Supp. 1999);
IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (Michie 1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 135/1-1 (West 1999);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2 (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE § 708.7 (1993 & Supp. 2000);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4113 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.070 (Michie 1999); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:285 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
506-A (West Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 123 (1996 & Supp. 2000); MASS. ANN.
LAWS. ch. 269, § 14A (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.41 li (West
1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.795 (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-45 (1999); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 565.090 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
311.02 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4 (West
1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-2 (Michie 1999); N.Y. PENAL § 240.26 (McKinney 2000);
N.Y. PENAL § 240.30 (McKinney 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07 (1999); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2917.21 (Anderson 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 2 1, § 1173 (1999); OR. REV. STAT.
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approximates that contained in the federal law at issue in Popa.
In New York, for instance, a person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the
second degree when, With intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm another person,
he or she communicates with a person anonymously by telephone in a manner likely
to cause annoyance or alarm.' 4 ' Alaska possesses a statute that provides that a
person commits the crime of harassment if he makes an anonymous phone call
"with intent to harass or annoy another person."' 42 In Colorado, a person who
"initiates communication with a person, anonymously or otherwise by telephone,
in a manner intended to harass" and with "intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another
person" commits harassment.4 3 Under Connecticut law, a person is guilty of
harassment in the second degree when, "with intent to harass, annoy or alarm
another person, he makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in
a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm."'" And in Hawaii, a person commits
the offense of harassment "if, with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm any other
person," the individual repeatedly "makes a communication anonymously."'4
In some states, it is enough just to make an anonymous phone call with the
intent of disturbing a person. For instance, in Missouri, "[a] person commits the
crime of harassment if for the purpose of frightening or disturbing another person,
he.. . makes a telephone call anonymously.' 4 6
The Popa decision, given its First Amendment roots, suggests that all such
statutes would be held unconstitutional as applied to speech like that of Ion Cornel
Popa if the case is followed by other courts. This, in turn, might force legislators
to review, revise, and update their state laws to comply with what might be dubbed
the Popa exception to telephonic harassment. The statutes, in particular, would
likely need to be redrafted with language exempting speech made with an intent to
convey a political message to a government official unless, perhaps, that speech
occurs so frequently or so often that it substantially or materially interferes with
government operations.
It will be recalled that the appellate court in Popa sided with the Romanian
political refugee and found that the federal statute "could have been drawn more
narrowly, without any loss of utility to the Government, by excluding from its scope
§ 166.090 (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5504 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (Law.
Co-op. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19B-1 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODEANN. § 39-17-
308 (1999); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106(1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1027 (2000); WA. REV. CODE § 9.61.230 (1999); WIs.
STAT. § 947.013 (1999).
'4' N.Y. PENAL § 240.30 (McKinney 2000).
142 ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(Michie 1999).
'41 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-11 (l)(e) (1999).
'44 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183(aX3) (West 1958 & Supp. 2000).
14I HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1 106(1)&(i)(d).(1993 & Supp. 1999).
146 Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.090.1(3) (1999).
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those who intend to engage in public or political discourse."7 If the reasoning of
Popa is accepted by other courts and in other jurisdictions, then state legislatures
would be compelled under the decision's rationale to engage in a process of more
narrowly tailoring their telephonic harassment laws to comply with the First
Amendment strictures.
The key to this redrafting appears to be the element of intent. It might be
enough, for instance, to redraft a statute with language that exempts speech made
"with a legitimate purpose or intent," since this would, under Popa's logic, sweep
up and protect political expression as a legitimate use of the freedom of speech.
Consider, for instance, Indiana's law regarding harassing communications.' 48 It
provides, in relevant part, that a person commits harassment "who, with intent to
harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate
communication, makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues.' 49
The use of the phrase "with no intent of legitimate communication" would seem to
provide an escape clause necessary to protect political messages (such as those of
Ion Cornel Popa) that are both annoying and alarming and, at the same time,
"legitimate communication."
Iowa's harassment statute features similar language.' It provides that
harassment by telephone occurs only if the communication occurs "without
legitimate purpose."'' This language allows individuals like Ion Cornel Popa to
argue that they had a legitimate purpose (engaging in political expression) that
might have been intertwined with the intent to annoy or alarm. Ultimately, of
course, it would be left to the trier of fact to determine whether or not such an intent
truly existed at the time the telephone calls were placed. The key is that language
such as Iowa's provides an avenue for defendants to escape culpability by proving
the legitimacy of their calls.
There is a major problem, however, with relying on this language concerning
"legitimate" communications to protect political expression. In February 2000, the
Supreme Court of Washington declared unconstitutional a city ordinance that
forbade telephone calls made with an intent to disturb or harass "[w]ithout purpose
of legitimate communication."'5 The high court of Washington held that this latter
language was unconstitutionally vague.' Under established principles of First
'4 United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
148 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2 (Michie 1998).
'" Id. (emphasis added).
Iso IOWA CODE § 708.7 (1993 & Supp. 2000). Iowa and Indiana are not alone in including
such language in their statutes. For instance, under North Dakota's harassment statute, a
person who makes repeated phone calls with the intent to frighten or harass another person
is guilty only if the calls are made "with no purpose of legitimate communication." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07(1)(c) (1999).
's' IOWA CODE § 708.7 (1993 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
152 City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 992 P.2d 496, 498 (Wash. 2000).
I d. at 502-03.
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Amendment jurisprudence, a law will be declared void for vagueness if people "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."' 54
Massachusetts' law criminalizing annoying telephone calls does not include
language such as that contained in Indiana's or Iowa's statutes, which exempt
"legitimate" calls. " It does, however, provide a safety valve for calls involving
political expression by limiting its application to calls made with "the sole purpose
of harassing, annoying or molesting."'"6 In interpreting this language, the Appeals
Court of Massachusetts held in 1991 that "[i]t is reasonable to conclude that the
Legislature, in using the term 'sole purpose,' sought to avoid the constitutional
pitfalls involved with the criminalization of speech or communication."'57 In other
Words, mixing in a legitimate purpose (attempting to engage a government official
in political speech) with an illegitimate one (harassing the individual) would protect
a telephone caller because there would be more than an illicitor illegal "sole
purpose" to the call. Multi-purpose calls in which one purpose is legitimate thus
would fall outside the reach of the statute and be protected.
Only time will reveal, of course, the acceptance of Popa's logic and reasoning.
If its logic and reasoning are accepted and followed, one can expect a number of
state statutes regulating telephonic harassment to be declared unconstitutional as
applied to speech such as that uttered by Ion Cornel Popa. What is more, one can
expect state legislators to go back to the drawing board to redraft their statutes to
comply with Popa's logic and reasoning. Some state statutes, as suggested above,
already contain language that might provide for a possible Popa exception,
exempting calls made for "legitimate" purposes, but this language itself is subject
to vagueness challenges.' 8 Thus, revising state statutes in a manner that passes
constitutional muster will not be an easy task if the Popa decision is widely
followed.It is also worth noting that Popa could have ramifications for other types of
state laws regulating anonymous expression or speech that is abusive and hostile
to police or other government officials. As noted' in Part I, the United States
Supreme Court consistently has declared unconstitutional those laws forbidding
anonymous expression if there is a danger of chilling expression by the compelled
Conally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
's See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2(a) (Michie 1999); IOWA CODE § 708.7(1)(a) (1999).
156 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 14A (Law. Co-op. 1999) (emphasis added).
157 Commonwealth v. Strahan, 570 N.E.2d 1041, 1043 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), review
denied, 576 N.E.2d 685 (Mass. 1991),further appellate review denied, 581 N.E.2d 481
(Mass. 1991).
158 See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
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disclosure of its author's identity.' 9 The Popa decision reinforces this
jurisprudence to the extent that it protects anonymous harassment of public
officials.
IV. SHOUT, SHOUT, LET IT ALL OUT: POLITICAL SPEECH IN THE MEDIATED AGE
Section A initially contextualizes Ion Cornel Popa's tortured efforts at political
speech within the framework of the mediated shout-and-attack culture of politics
prevalent on both call-in radio programs and cable news channel talk shows today.
To the extent that one accepts Popa's argument that he was engaging in political
speech, that speech can be seen as the unfortunate and shoddy byproduct of what
passes for political expression and discourse on shows such as Hannity & Colmes
on the Fox News Channel and Hardball with Chris Matthews on CNBC. If these
shows have influenced how we, as a democracy and a country, conceptualize
political discussion, then it makes complete sense for the appellate court to protect
Popa's speech because he merely is operating within the media-created paradigm
of political discourse.
Section B then contends that even if the media has influenced and dumbed-
down our beliefs about, and conceptions of, political speech, Ion Cornel Popa's
speech falls far outside of the scope of the ideals of political speech articulated both
by Alexander Meiklejohn and the United States Supreme Court in New York Times
v. Sullivan.60 This section suggests that, unless the speech becomes too frequent
and unduly burdensome on government operations and affairs, we must protect the
speech of Ion Cornel Popa lest we risk creating a First Amendment hierarchy in
which only those more educated and eloquent speakers receive its protections.
A. The Politics of Babble
In the 1990si the rise of parallel media phenomena created an atmosphere ripe
for a court's holding that Ion Cornel Popa's anonymous racial epithets and generic
allegations of criminal conduct constitute political speech. These twin forces are
call-in radio political shows and television political and news talk programs.
1. Telephonic Discourse and Call-In Democracy
The presidential election of 1992 between incumbent George Bush and Bill
Clinton has been dubbed the "talk show campaign."' 6' Politics moved into a new
119 Supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
160 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16 C. Richard Hofstetter & Christopher L. Gianos, Political Talk Radio: Actions Speak
Louder than Words, 41 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 501, 501 (1997)
(attributing this description to Tom Shales, television critic for the Washington Post); see
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realm, a realm in which callers and audience guests could directly ask politicians
questions, or, alternatively, could ventilate their feelings to a sympathetic talk show
host. 2 Talk programming and call-in shows were pervasive during the 1992
campaign.' 63 In turn, talk radio hosts and their guests on many programs, according
to political scientist C. Richard Hofstetter, "attack government, specific policies,
and opposing leaders while using this position as a way to advance their own
ideologies."'"
The rise of talk radio politics, according to NBC news anchor Tom Brokaw, is
at least partly attributable to:
A sense of frustration out there on the part of the people that they are not
being heard and that they are being blocked out in some way. Life is
more complex for them, and they want a chance to express their point of
view, and they want someone to give voice to their own frustrations and
to their own anxieties.
6 5
Political call-in radio shows such as those hosted by Rush Limbaugh and G.
Gordon Liddy are very popular.'" Callers express their feelings and anger. This
all represents what some have called "a new kind of mediated public deliberation"
that is far removed from Meiklejohn's rubric of the town hall meeting.6 7 The
quality of that discussion is sometimes suspect. Professor Susan Herbst of
Northwestern University observed in a 1995 article that hosts sometimes take calls
from "very belligerent callers" in part "because many of these programs thrive on
conflict."'6" The hosts, she writes, often encourage listeners to vent their anger.'
69
EDWIN DIAMOND & ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, WHITE HOUSE TO YOUR HOUSE 2 (1995)
("Clinton, Perot, and, belatedly, George Bush, and their running mates, made thirty-nine
separate appearances on Larry King Live, CBS This Morning, Good Morning America,
Today, and syndicated talk shows from September 1 to October 19.").
62 See John E. Newhagen, Self-Efficacy and Call-in Political Television Show Use, 21
COMM. RES. 366, 366 (1994) (observing that the typical call-in format "included ajournalist-
moderator, who introduced telephone callers by name and hometown. Callers' questions
were then incorporated into the audio portion of the program, with the candidate's response
often including a conversation with the caller").
63 See Susan Herbst, On Electronic Public Space: Talk Shows in Theoretical Perspective,
12 POL. CoMM. 263, 263 (1995).
'6 Hofstetter & Gianos, supra note 161, at 502.
165 Tom Brokaw et al., Talk Show Democracy '96, HARV. INT'L J. PRESS & POL., Winter
1997, at4, 7.
166 See id at 5. (quoting Kathleen Hall Jamieson of the Annenberg School for
Communication at the University of Pennsylvania for the contention that "1 8 percent of the
national adult population is listening to political call-in radio at least twice a week").
167 Benjamin I. Page & Jason Tannenbaum, Populistic Deliberation and Talk Radio, 46
J. OF COMM. 33, 33 (1996).
168 Herbst, supra note 163, at 271.
169 See id.
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As radio journalist Diane Rehm recently wrote, "talk radio has become a tool
with which critics of government lash out, poisoning the dialogue with talk of
federal conspiracy and loss of individual rights."'7 The bottom line, she writes, is
that "[t]he level of discourse in everyday. public life seems to have been infected by
the world of talk radio, where the loudest, angriest voices receive the greatest
amount of attention and exposure."'
7
'
Ion Cornel Popa's speech certainly was loud and angry, like a call-in listener
on a talk radio program. Popa's speech, in fact, was even more savvy and effective
than that on the call-in radio programs. Why? Popa cut out the middleman (the
radio host) and called in directly to the politicalfigure whom he wanted to attack:
Eric Holder. If call-in talk radio teaches listeners about the nature of political
speech and discourse, then we should be far from startled by Popa's messages and
his argument that he was exercising his First Amendment right to engage in political
expression.
2. The Squabble and Rhetoric of Televised Political Talk
From the cable news channels to the old mainstream broadcast networks,
television today is awash in what Alicia Shepard of the American Journalism
Review calls a "shout culture, where the proliferation of talk shows offers viewers
a seemingly endless array of polarized political warfare."'7" And who is invited to
participate on these "political shout shows,"'" as Shepard dubs them? Individuals
who "are vociferous shouters who are at home in a circus-like atmosphere.' 74
Almost everything on shows such as Crossfire, Hardball and the Capital Gang
is reduced to what Georgetown University's Deborah Tannen calls a "left-right
fight."'7  She writes:
The very structure of these shows is based on underlying metaphors of
war and sports: Two sides duke it out; one wins, the other loses. But
it's all a game: See the warring parties jocularly sparring at the end of
the show, as the camera pulls away? Those who take part in these
pseudo-debates know that there is a display aspect to it.
76
370 Diane Rehm, A Tower of Babble: Talks Shows and Politics, HARV. INT'L J. PRESS &
POL., Winter 1996, at 138, 140.
171 Id. at 141.
72 Alicia C. Shepard, White Noise, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 20, 22.
173 I.
174 id.
"7 Deborah Tannen, TV's War of Words, BRILL'S CONTENT, Sept. 1999, at 88, 88.
176 ld at 89.
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I Both the circus-like atmosphere and the display aspect of these shows that
Shepard and Tannen respectively describe suggest that politics is something in
which discussion is almost superfluous.. As Tannen writes, "[t]he shout-down
-shows distort public discussion."' James Fallows, former editor of US. News &
'World Report, emphasized precisely this point in his scathing 1996 critique of the
media and politics, Breaking the News. 7 Fallows writes that "[t]he pressure to
keep things lively means that squabbling replaces dialogue."'" And the
ramifications of this cacophony, according to Fallows? "The discussion shows that
are supposed to add to public understanding may actually reduce it, by hammering
home the message that 'issues' don't matter except as items for politicians to
squabble about. '
It is ironic, of course, that these programs are called "talk", shows since they
often have very little to do with well-reasoned discussion or discourse. More often,
they involve guests (combatants, really) shouting over one another, resulting in what
Alexander Meiklejohn might have called "a dialectical free-for-all."''
This, then, is the level of political discourse created by the mass media. This,
in turn, is how we increasingly expect political discussion to be framed, however
disappointing it may be. Thus, we should not be too surprised when someone like
Ion Cornel Popa believes he is engaging in political speech when he uses epithets
and name calling, in anonymous fashion, when leaving telephone messages for
government officials. It is important that the case be contextualized in this manner
because it suggests that, indeed, Popa was operating within a media-legitimated
framework of political discourse when he called Holder's office. Popa's
expression, although abusive and hostile, was not outside of the mainstream.
While this section has placed Ion Cornel Popa's speech within the modern-day
context of mediated political discourse on radio and television, the next section
takes a step back in time and compares his speech to the ideals established by both
Alexander Meiklejohn and the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan.
B. Popa and Politics: A Far Cry--And Shout-From Meiklejohn and Sullivan
I. The Meiklejohn Ideal
If Ion Cornel Popa's telephone messages really did constitute political speech,
as the appellate court concluded, it is still far removed from the ideals of political
177 Id.
"I JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS: HOW THE MEDIA UNDERMINE AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1996).
Id at 16.
1I d. at 20.
181 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 25.
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expression articulated by Alexander Meiklejohn described earlier in this Article. 82
A comparison between the two brings this contrast into relief.
First, Meiklejohn admonished that the First Amendment is "not the guardian of
unregulated talkativeness"" 3 and that public discussion must not become "a
dialectical free.-for-all. ' '"I Popa's messages,. however, amounted to mini-tirades of
unregulated talkativeness in which he lashed out in free-for-all fashion. What is
more, he was using rhetoric-racial rhetoric-that in no way was part of a dialectic.
Meiklejohn, it must be emphasized, called for "responsible and regulated
discussion." 'ss Leaving anonymous and vitriolic telephone messages is in no way
responsible, nor is it discussion. Popa, by hiding behind the cloak of anonymity, is
not taking responsibility for his expression. Popa's speech, in fact, is more like the
verbal cacophony and free-for-all in the talk shows described in Section A; shows
that, although often focused on public issues, represent the height of irresponsible
discussion.
Second, Meiklejohn, using the town hall meeting as the ideal, suggested that
speech "upon matters of public interest" should occur "to get business done."'1
8 6
One must wonder not only whether Popa's speech really was on matters of the
public interest, but also whether it was made with the purpose of accomplishing any
business other than to annoy and harass Eric Holder. Likewise, to the extent that
Meiklejohn famously believed that "[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said," ' 7 one must seriously
question whether Popa's speech was at all worth saying. Perhaps, in turn, it is not
essential that Popa be allowed to express his message in the particular manner and
via the particular medium that he chose. Meiklejohn, it must be remembered, called
for protecting expression that would cultivate "the general intelligence."'8 8 It is
hard to see how Popa's messages cultivate or nurture the intelligence of anyone, let
alone the intelligence of the voting public about which Meiklejohn was most
concerned.
Third, Meiklejohn suggested that speech could be abridged when it was
redundant or repetitive.8 9 It will be recalled that Popa made seven phone calls
282 See supra Part i.A.
28' MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 26.
194 Id. at 25.
185 Id.
286 Id. at 24
d87 I  at 26.
188 Id. at 20.
289 Meiklejohn wrote:
If, for example, at a town meeting, twenty like-minded citizens have become a
"party," and if one of them has read to the meeting an argument which they have
all approved, it would be ludicrously out of order for each of the others to insist
on reading it again.
id at 26.
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during one month. It is hard to argue (at least, to argue reasonably) that after one
or two messages anything new or-worthy was added to what' had already been
expressed.
On the other hand, Meiklejohn's work might support protection of Ion Cornel
Popa's expression. In particular, Meiklejohn argued that citizens must be protected
when they make verbal attacks upon "the policies of the government" and when
they attempt to "show the unfitness of a candidate for governmental office."'" In
his messages suggesting that the rights of white people Were violated by a
"criminal" United States attorney, Popa arguably is criticizing the policies of
government and, in particular, attacking a person in government office. Meiklejohn
called for unqualified First Amendment protection when citizens "pass judgment
upon the decisions which our agents make" about issues of public concern.' 9' One
might contend that Popa was merely passing judgment on the law enforcement
policies of Eric Holder and thus his speech is both political and deserving of the
most protection.
It seems possible then, that while Popa might have been engaging in political
expression, the mode and manner of his speech violated Meiklejohnian principles
of deliberative discourse. The next section goes a step further, analyzing Popa's
speech under the rubric of one of theimost important free speech cases of the past
fifty years-a case imbued with Meiklejohnian reasoning.'"
2. The Sullivan Ideal
When the United States Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan,
Justice Brennan wrote that the Court was considering the case "against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open."' No one would argue
that Ion Cornel Popa's speech was not "uninhibited" or "robust." The problem,
however, is that Popa's speech arguably does not constitute debate on public issues.
In fact, the Romanian refugee was not engaging in debate at all. He was, instead,
leaving messages with clerical personnel. There was no debate with Eric Holder.
On the other hand, Brennan also wrote about the importance of "the citizen,
critic of government," observing that "[i]t is as much his duty to criticize as it is the
official's duty to administer."" To the extent that Popa was criticizing Holder (a
'9' Meiklejohn, supra note 25, at 259.
19' Id. at 255.
,92 See Paul E. Kostyu, The First Amendment in Theory and Practice, in
COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 21, 32 (W. Wat Hopkins ed., 2000) (writing that "Justice
Brennan's apparent acceptance of Meiklejohn's philosophy was manifested in the landmark
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan").
,9' 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
194 Id. at 282.
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government official) for making "a violent crime against me,"'"" Popa was fulfilling
the Court-envisioned obligation of the citizen-critic. The mere fact that he was
doing this in an offensive or disagreeable manner, and employing racist' expressions,
does not render Popa immune to First Amendment protection. As Justice Brennan
would write twenty-five years later, in a decision protecting the right to bum the
United States flag, "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."'"
What is more, racist expression-hate speech or "words that wound," as some
critical legal theorists call it' 97 -is protected by the First Amendment, especially
when coupled with a political component. Popa's speech did not fall within the
categories of either fighting words' 98 or incitement to violence;' 99 speech outside the
scope of the First Amendment. Leaving a telephone message that calls a
government official such as Eric Holder a criminal, either because he is "a negro"2°
or because he "make a violent crime against me,"' .' does not fit into these
categories.
It thus is the concept of citizen-critic in Sullivan that most supports the
protection, at least from a public policy standpoint, of Popa's expression. The
Sullivan Court did not qualify or modify the concept of citizen-critic, such as by
'9 United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
196 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
197 MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
Fighting words, as defined by the United States Supreme Court in 1942, are "those
[words] which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). That doctrine has
been narrowed, however, to apply to direct, face-to-face personal insults. See Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (holding that the fighting words standard is limited to
speech only if it has "a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom,
individually, the remark is addressed"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
(upholding an individual's use of a four-letter word on his jacket because there was no
evidence the word could be taken "as a direct personal insult'). Supreme Court decisions
have "made clear that the 'fighting words' exception to first amendment [sic] protection
must be narrowly construed." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 850
(2d ed. 1988).
" Speech that advocates violence or illegal action is protected by the First Amendment
"except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969). This principle, articulated over thirty years ago, represents what constitutional law
scholar Erwin Chemerinsky calls the Court's "most speech protective formulation of an
incitement test." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
813 (1997). See RALPH HOLSINGER AND JON PAUL DILTs, MEDIA LAW 82 (4th ed. 1997)
(observing that, after Brandenburg, "[a]ny law that fails to make clear the distinction
between urging people to take up arms against their government and merely talking about
doing so violates the First Amendment").
200 Popa, 187 F.3d at 674..
201 Id.
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holding that only the 'eloquent citizen-critic" or the "well-spoken citizen critic"
deserves protection, but not the "inarticulate citizen-critic" or "racist citizen-critic."
In summary, Sullivan privileges vigorous "public debate"2 ' by the "citizen-
critic" 3 about government officials and policies. While it is clear that Popa was
critical of a government official, it is equally clear that he was not engaged in public
debate but in private hate. He was not engaging Holder or his office in discourse,
but was simply leaving messages.
It must be pointed out, however, that subsequent to Sullivan the Supreme Court
has protected political expression even though it was, like Popa's telephone
messages, offensive, ineloquent, and non-discursive. In Cohen v. California,"°4 the
Court protected the right of Paul Robert Cohen to wear a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft" inside the Los Angeles County Courthouse. ' Although Cohen's
jacket, unlike Popa's messages, clearly carried a political message,' it was not an
attempt to engage in dialogue or discourse or debate. The jacket, in brief, did not
talk with anyone. It simply bore a message, there to be read and digested or ignored
and overlooked, much like Popa left messages for Eric Holder, there to be read and
digested or ignored and overlooked.
On the other hand, the harassing nature of Popa's speech is far clearer than that
of Paul Robert Cohen. Popa's speech was repetitive and, more importantly, it was
directed toward a particular person: Eric Holder. Cohen's speech, on the other
hand, was directed to no one in particular, instead expressing a general sentiment.
No matter how untethered the Popa decision may be from its Meiklejohnian and
Sullivan moorings, we must nonetheless protect Popa's speech if we value free
expression in a democratic society. If any reasonable argument can be made that
Popa's messages constitute political speech, it must receive some protection. The
inevitable limits on that protection, however, are discussed further in the conclusion
of this article.
CONCLUSION
Ion Comel Popa won his battle, but did political speech lose the war? Was this,
in other words, a Pyrrhic First Amendment victory, one won at excessive costs?
When a court finds that a significant component of race baiting and repetitive
telephone messages actually constitutes political speech, to the point where it is
exempted from an otherwise neutral and generally applicable law regarding
2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
203 Id. at 282.
204 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
205 id. at 16.
206 Cohen "testified that he wore the jacket knowing that the words were on the jacket as
a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and
the draft." Id.
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telephonic harassment, °7 political speech has reached a very low point in the United
States.
Protecting Popa's expression may simply be the cost paid by a free society in
which almost all speech is valued, no matter how offensive or vile. It must be
particularly true when that speech is at all political in nature, however tangential it
may be. Nearly sixty years ago,. the United States Supreme Court in Near v.
Minnesota28 recognized that we must put up with some noxious expression in order
to reap the benefits of valuable speech. Writing the majority opinion in Near, Chief
Justice Charles Evan Hughes observed:
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything,
and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press. It has
accordingly been decided by the practice of the States, that it is better to
leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by
pruning them away, to injure the vigour [sic] of those yielding the proper
fruits.2"
Although this Shakespearean-sounding quotation refers to the press, the same
can easily be saidabout speech in general. As a society, we gain strength and
identity from tolerating intolerant speech such as Popa's name calling of Holder.
As current University of Michigan President Lee Bollinger wrote in 1986, "free
speech involves a special act of carving out one area of social interaction for
extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate a
social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social encounters.""2 ' From
this tolerance, Bollinger adds, develops "a shared intuition that the society adds
something important to its identity, that it is significantly strengthened, by these acts
of extraordinary tolerance." ''
Must, then, all harassing calls such as Popa's be tolerated? Surely there must
be some limit. Perhaps that limit is reached when the repetition and frequency of
the calls increases to the point when they substantially and materially interfere with
the government's business. It will be recalled that Popa made seven phone calls in
the span of one month-an amount that the appellate court found was no more than
a "brief distraction to the clerical staff who answered Popa's calls." '212 Had Popa
called every day, or multiple times on several different occasions, he might have
clogged up the staff's time and resources; it would have left Holder with a flood of
messages to which he might respond, consuming his time both repetitively and
207 See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
208 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
209 Id at 718.
210 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 10 (1986).
211 id. at9.
212 United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
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redundantly were he to read, much less answer, each message.
The problem here, of course, is one of line drawing. How many calls is too
many calls? Where is the line to be drawn between a "brief distraction" and a
substantial and material disruption?" 3 Future courts will be forced to confront this
issue because the Popa decision opened the way for telephonic harassment of public
officials but, simultaneously, failed to articulate with any precision the endpoint of
this right.
The bottom line is that the Popa decision, though perhaps essential .for
preserving the important place of political expression in the United States, is
nonetheless a disturbing commentary on the state of political speech in this country.
It remains unclear how far courts will now be willing to go to stretch the definition
of political discourse in a tortured fashion that does not truly help democracy at all.
Sadly, we are now several generations removed from the Sullivan decision and light
years away from the political discourse that the late Justice Brennan privileged in
that case.
We may have foisted this sad state of affairs upon our ourselves through our
pandering to the shout-culture of television political talk shows described in Part IV.
If we cannot trust some of the most ostensibly knowledgeable and articulate people
in society (journalists) to engage in rational discourse, 14 then how can we expect
anything better from a political refugee like Ion Cornel Popa hailing from a
formerly totalitarian state such as Romania? This is the reality that we must
confront, regardless of whether one concludes that the Popa case was rightly or
wrongly decided.
2,3 In a New York state case involving telephonic harassment it was held that the
defendant's action in calling the police department twenty-seven times in a span of less than
three-and-a-half hours, after police informed the defendant that the matter in question was
civil rather than criminal and that he should not call again because he was tying up phone
lines, was not entitled to constitutional protection. People v. Smith, 392 N.Y.S.2d 968 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, Smith v. New York, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
224 See Clay Calvert, The Law of Objectivity: Sacrificing Individual Expression for
Journalism Norms, 34 GONzAGA L. REv. 19,41 (1998/99) (observing that "Uj]ournalists are
often knowledgeable about political affairs and articulate and effective writers").
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